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Intelligence Debate

A review in public of the functions and performance of the highly secret Central Intelligence Agency is likely to provoke intense controversy at the new session of Congress. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is expected to set a date for opening hearings on a joint resolution introduced by Senator Eugene J. McCarthy last April 27, ten days after the abortive Cuban invasion.

The resolution provides for creation of a Joint Committee of the House and Senate on Foreign Intelligence and Information. The committee, in the words of McCarthy, would "establish some kind of continuing supervision over foreign policy activities and foreign intelligence and information programs by the United States government."

A similar proposal was given extended consideration by the Senate in 1956. Pressure for instituting a form of congressional supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency comparable to that exercised over the Atomic Energy Commission may be stronger today than it was six years ago.

Failure of the anti-Castro Cuban invasion, which was carried out under the direction of CIA, called into question again the almost unlimited extent of that agency's powers and, in particular, its participation in foreign ventures that carry risk of seriously damaging the prestige and interests of the United States.

Senator McCarthy said, when he introduced the pending joint resolution, that he considered it to be "a proper responsibility on the part of the members of the United States Congress to accept responsibility in this field, to be informed, and to be involved when major policy decisions are called for." He added: "Under the Constitution, Congress is called upon to participate in a declaration of war. In modern times, war is not declared. Congress, therefore, has a continuing and a very substantial responsibility for policy decisions with regard to the cold war or conducting foreign policy by any other means."

Since the Cuban invasion, the Central Intelligence Agency has acquired a new director -- former Atomic Energy Commission Chairman John A. McCone -- and its operations have been the subject of review by two Presidential boards. Their findings and recommendations presumably will be available to the Foreign Relations Committee, though perhaps not to the public, when the McCarthy resolution is taken up for consideration.

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(CIA)

WASHINGTON--SEN. MILTON R. YOUNG, R-N.D., TODAY WAS NAMED TO SUCCEED THE LATE SEN. STYLES BRIDGES, R-NH., ON THE SPECIAL APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE HANDLING CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY MATTERS.

OTHERS ON THE GROUP ARE SENS. CARL HAYDEN, D-ARIZ., CHAIRMAN OF THE APPROPRIATION GROUP, WHO NAMED YOUNG; RICHARD B. RUSSELL, D-GA., DENNIS CHAVEZ, D-N.M., AND LEVERETT SALTONSTALL, R-MASS.

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U.S. Should Always Keep Eye on Cuba

By W. D. Workman

At least one Congressman, among those convening today in Washington, is fed up with American hands-off policy toward Cuba, and is willing to invade the island if necessary.

Rep. L. Mendel Rivers (D-S.C.), a ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, hopes that Congress will put pressure on the executive branch to take a firm stand against the Communist threat posed by Fidel Castro.

Rep. Rivers is especially fired up at the moment because of the Indian invasion of the Portuguese enclave of Goa. He says that if the United Nations can justify that action, then the U.N. should be jubilant over a United States' seizure of Cuba.

It may be questioned whether he actually wants this country to take over Cuba lock-stock-and-barrel. But there is no doubting his hope that we do whatever is needed to safeguard the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo, the rights of Americans in Cuba, and the national defense of the United States itself.

Whatever happens to the Rivers proposal, it at least should clear away some of the fog surrounding the United States policy toward Cuba. The fiasco of last spring, which never has been satisfactorily explained to the American people, left these offshore international waters muddier than ever. And recurring reports of other expeditions being readied for anti-Castro operations in Cuba are contributing to the confusion.

For the time being, one has no one invoked the federal statute which forbids use of American soil as a pre-warson staging area. Section 2 of Title 18 says, in positive language:

"Whoever, within the United States, knowingly begins or sets on foot or provides or prepares a means for or furnishes the money for, or takes part in, any military or naval expedition or enterprise to be carried on from thence against the territory or dominion of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district,

or people, shall be fined not more than \$3,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both."

For another thing, should this law apply to agencies of the federal government itself, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, which has been credited with cooking up much of the anti-Castro activity?

Such laws have been in the federal statutes since the days of George Washington. They were invoked time and again during the mid-19th century, when American sentiment, especially in the South, favored the liberation of Cuba from Spanish rule.

During that period, three American presidents in succession — Zachary Taylor, Millard Fillmore, and Franklin Pierce—all found it necessary to issue proclamations warning against participation in military expeditions for Cuban liberation.

The proclamations were not effective in all cases, for that persuasive Venezuelan adventurer, Marcos Lopez, managed not only to raise expeditions in the United States, but to launch them. Twice he led "liberation" forces ashore on Cuba. The first attempt fizzled, and the invaders withdrew back to the United States. The second effort a year later, in 1851, brought even worse luck, for Lopez and a number of his followers, mostly Southerners, were captured by the Spaniards and executed.

Almost a half-century later the United States itself got involved in the liberation of Cuba, and put the island on the road to independence. Today, the Port of the Americas stands at the end of that road, and once more Americans are concerned over the situation.

This concern should properly be aired in the Congress. The opportunity may be presented by a latter-day South Carolinian who might well quote an illustrious predecessor from his state, John Pickens, once said of Cuba in correspondence with Andrew Jackson:

"An American statesman ought to draw his eye from it."

Intelligence For Security

Echoes of last spring's disastrous invasion of Cuba will soon be heard on Capitol Hill. Because the Central Intelligence Agency pulled the strings in that attempt to topple Castro's dictatorship, and because the attempt failed, new life has been injected into an old proposal to subject this super-secret arm of the federal government to a degree of congressional supervision.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee is going to put down for public hearing a resolution sponsored by Sen. Eugene J. McCarthy, D-Minn., and co-sponsored by 18 other Democratic senators and three Republican senators. The resolution, introduced shortly after the anti-Castro forces met disaster at the Bay of Pigs last April, would establish a joint congressional committee to exercise "some kind of continuing supervision over foreign policy activities and foreign intelligence... programs".

A similar proposal was rejected by the Senate in 1956. Sen. Carl Hayden declared then that "Congress has no right to regulate an agency... designed solely to provide the President with information to enable him to make decisions." Considerable concern was expressed also lest establishment of such a committee lead to disclosure by members of the committee of information that should be held secret. Yet the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, on which the proposed new joint committee would be patterned, has functioned satisfactorily in another highly sensitive field.

Dissatisfaction with the C. I. A.'s performance in the Cuban affair, and growing uneasiness over the agency's participation in undercover operations

foreign intelligence activities a more sympathetic hearing than it received in 1956. Everyone recognizes that effective intelligence-gathering activities are vital to the security of the United States. But whether an intelligence agency should engage also in free-wheeling paramilitary operations that may, if unsuccessful, gravely compromise the country's interests and prestige now seems debatable.

It is understood that, following the Cuban invasion, both the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and a special board of inquiry headed

by Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor recommended that conduct of paramilitary operations be turned over to the Defense Department. While President Kennedy is believed to have placed operations in C.I.A., he is not known to have stripped it of responsibility for undercover operations unrelated to intelligence gathering. Reorganization of the agency is now proceeding under leadership of its new director, former Atomic Energy Commission Chairman John A. McCone, who took over from Allen W. Dulles in November.

Nearly a score of federal departments and agencies, in addition to C.I.A., have intelligence units of their own or participate in analysis and evaluation of material of interest in particular fields. The Central Intelligence Agency, created by the National Security Act of 1947, is directly responsible to the National Security Council and evaluates on an over-all basis the information gathered by its own agents and by other intelligence units.

Excerpt from "The Day"

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TULLY: "The CIA was in full charge."

CHANCELLOR: "It was in full charge."

TULLY: "It not only gathered information, but it did something else which I think wrong, which is going to be corrected by President Kennedy--it operated on that intelligence. In other words, it gathered the intelligence and then launched an operation based on that intelligence, rather than handing the intelligence to somebody else and letting them appraise it."

CHANCELLOR: "Well, isn't that at the root of a lot of the criticism about the CIA, that it not only gathers information, but then it has the power now to carry out operations based on its own estimates?"

TULLY: "That's right, it did have the power--to carry out operations based on its own estimates. I think that's been changed now. I think in the future CIA will gather intelligence, appraise it and hand it over, and of course will advise on what operations should be launched."

CHANCELLOR: "But the basic dilemma is, it seems to me, that if we're going to have an intelligence operation, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE OPERATION, in this country, a lot of it is going to have to be secret, no matter what you do."

TULLY: "Oh, of course."

CHANCELLOR: "Is there any better way that you see that it could be administered or run?"

TULLY: "Well, Mike Mansfield, Senate Majority Leader, for years has been trying to get a bill passed to establish a watchdog committee, similar to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, and there's been great opposition to it. One of the reasons is our European contacts, our contacts all over the world, who cooperate now with CIA, are not anxious to share their information with a bunch of congressmen, so you don't have that same situation with AEC. And CIA has successfully fought it. Eisenhower opposed it, and I don't know how Kennedy feels about it, but I suspect he's taking a very hard look at it."

CHANCELLOR: "In that--you mean he might come out and support the Mansfield proposal?"

TULLY: "I don't know, I don't think he will, I think he's taking a very hard look at it. I think Kennedy feels that now that he's taken charge, he's competent to handle things."

CHANCELLOR: "Listen, Andy, we've talked about a lot of the criticism about the CIA--we've got about a minute left--it always

LINDSAY: "But Barry, Barry you're living in a dream world when you say that. In theory the FBI is doing nothing but protecting the unsuspecting housewife against the incursions of bank robbers, kidnappers and subversive agents from foreign governments in the United States. Now if there ever was an organization which — in which the abuse of power creeps into from time to time, and if there was an organization that occasionally misuses that power, it's the FBI, and thank God that there is some system that double checks this kind of thing.

"Now I don't mean to say that the situation with the CIA is exactly comparable, because it isn't. But the fact still remains that you've got a tremendous organization staffed by Americans with a great deal of power and money behind them. We're not naturally very good at this business."

GRAY: "No we're not."

LINDSAY: "And we tend to get into ruts that are the wrong ruts. As was just pointed out, a moment ago."

GRAY: "I'd suggest we appropriate about ten million, or ten billion — I mean figures; it's just another zero, or two, and land-lease the whole project to the English and say it's your baby, under contract. Because the British are superb."

LINDSAY: "They're masters."

GRAY: "Masters of espionage and have always been and we look like small children attempting the same work. Now we're — we are offshoots of the Anglo-Saxon society and I don't understand why we're so bad at it. Any comments from anyone? Mr. Huess?"

HUESS: "Yes, I would like to ask the Congressman without being rude — whether or not I agree with you I won't say but what would you substitute for the CIA? Any better ideas?"

LINDSAY: "Oh I'm not going to substitute anything for the CIA. All I'm suggesting is that — that I've come 180 degrees around from the first direction I was on, which was — I was opposed to the notion of joint committee on Capital Hill to supervise or examine or watch-dog the CIA, and I've reversed my thinking on this and I've come to the conclusion finally that I think it's high time and a necessary thing."

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LINDSAY: "Well I'm not so sure it is. It's not good enough for me. I don't think..."

GRAY: "Well who are the three or four men?"

LINDSAY: "Well the chairman of the Appropriations Committee in the House is a fellow by the name of Cannon, from Missouri, and I can think of a hundred Congressmen who I'd much rather have being the watchdog on this kind of thing.

"You go down the line. You come men like Rooney of New York and..."

GRAY: "Is he the Congressman from Hamaroneck?"

LINDSAY: "Brooklyn."

GRAY: "Oh that one. Yes."

LINDSAY: "You've got -- you've got good Congressmen here, there's no question about it, but I think that it is possible to create a structure to examine what goes on in this huge organization that is, that could be an effective check. As it is now there is none, and I do not think that it is a healthy situation to have an organization of this size, of this power with this amount of money..."

GRAY: "Why?"

LINDSAY: "Without check at all."

GRAY: "But you're in favor of espionage and informers."

LINDSAY: "Oh sure."

GRAY: "Because we -- we've had a Secretary of State in the past who said it was a dirty business, and said it was something like listening to somebody's party line, going back to a period before World War I I believe. Mr. Willis."

WILLIS: "The effectiveness of the CIA, it's always very hard to tell how effective they really are on the plus side."

GRAY: "Or, how much is a revolution worth. That's an even tougher question."

WILLIS: "It's awfully hard to tell because they can't come out many times and say well, we knew that was going to happen -- because you know they can't reveal the sources, they can't reveal how close they were, and of course when they're right they can't always say that either. It's an awfully tough spot. They have a very difficult public relations program to conduct to the public."

GRAY: "I don't think there ought to be any public relations program. That's the thing that disturbs me most, that I recognize certainly the pros of a democratic society but there's one area that just has to be recognized as so unwholesome and so black handed (sic) and so under cover and yet necessary in the evil world that we live in that the business of going around hat in hand and say gee folks, CIA is good for everybody -- this is kind of a..."

that in our system, hostile as all of us are to organizations of this kind basically, that there is room for a check and balance.

GRAY: "But it's a good one and a very important one. Mr. Swinton?"

SWINTON: "Well Barry I think in the CIA there's one point on which I would agree with the Congressman, and that is that in their operations as they have become evident, certain facets of their operations, they have dealt with existing politicians and existing political leaders. I'm not talking about the espionage part of their operations. I'm talking about the operational side, where you get a revolution which has a certain amount of assistance or you get a political movement which has a certain amount of assistance.

"They have not, and so far as I know no American organization has developed leaders who essentially believe in. We've tried to develop young leaders to work on the grass roots political levels. Now in no organization do you get an effective political system unless you start right down at the precinct level and the local level. And it seems to me that when you, if you will, buy an election, which has happened several times, you're not doing yourself any basic good.

"The thing to do is to get down to the fundamental problem and develop people on your side. And the big criticism, as I say, that I have heard of the CIA abroad is that they're dealing with, frequently, fairly discredited political leaders to get an immediate result now rather than building for the long run."

GRAY: "I don't think I'm thinking of that aspect of it with Mr. Tully's book rather fresh in my mind and I'm also very well aware of the fact that Mr. Dulles is not speaking to Mr. Tully since the book has come out, as Mr. Tully told me here about a week ago.

"The fact is that espionage is a fact of life, that we have been rather stupid about it and heavy handed about it as witness our toil in the U-2 incident, probably the most bungled story in modern history, and that I get very nervous about laymen and I would put Congress in that category for the purpose of this discussion -- I get very nervous when I think of laymen investigating the moneybags or going into a underground organization that is developed purely for secret operations of this kind."

LINDSAY: "Let me interrupt. You'd be surprised how professional and how proficient the members, some of the members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy have become on a subject much more complex in many ways...."

GRAY: "Well, I sincerely pray for that to be true. But I remember too many occasions in our very present history, recent history, where Congressmen in terms or elections or attempting to sway voters, will say excitable things or under the pressure of the moment and we can be in a very difficult position.

"Now when you tell me that three or four men on the finance committee on -- or Appropriations Committee on The Hill are aware of what is happening in the CIA and what happens to their money, I would ask you which three or four men and I would guess that that's good enough for me."

GRAY: "Well, Mr. Hues just a moment. I'd like to back up to John Lindsay for a moment again. What means a joint congressional committee taking a hard look at the CIA? What's proposed?"

LINDSAY: "What is proposed is that we do the same thing that we do in atomic energy. In the field of atomic energy there's a Joint Congressional Committee -- that is, a Senate and House committee -- that has jurisdiction to supervise in a watchdog sense the activities of the Atomic Energy Commission. It has worked splendidly to a lot of peoples' surprise. They've worked intelligently, they've had differences and they've hammered them out.

"There have been practically no leaks out of that joint committee. They've got good men on it. I argued this at great length with the former director of the CIA. He was very much opposed to this."

GRAY: "Mr. Dulles."

LINDSAY: "Yes, and he argued -- he said well there's an entirely different situation because the Joint Atomic Energy Commission (sic) is deeply involved in contracting out, they are doing business as a government agency all over the United States and naturally the Congress has a function to continually examine what they're doing, whereas, his argument went, the CIA is not involved in that kind of public business, and he was very disturbed over the possibility of a special committee set up for the purpose of examining the affairs of the CIA."

GRAY: "I'm disturbed about it too. I'm very disturbed about it, because when you say to me..."

LINDSAY: "I've come right around on this..."

GRAY: "But when you say to me that there are very few leaks, in quotes, vis-a-vis the atomic energy investigating commission -- very few leaks can mean awful dangerous business when your getting in the CIA."

LINDSAY: "So far as I have knowledge of the subject, Barry, there were none of any importance. That -- that committee has worked very well and it's been of service, too."

GRAY: "It's so easy to beat the drum and get people excited on the subject of the CIA. The fact is that we are finally I think coming of age with reference to espionage. We recognize it as a necessary evil in 1962 in the everyday practical politics of the world."

LINDSAY: "Well that may be a fact but the fact is also that there are millions upon millions of dollars that are spent..."

GRAY: "Yes."

LINDSAY: "...by this agency and nobody has any idea at all, with the exception of possible three or four men on Capitol Hill on the Appropriations Committee as to, as to the effectiveness of it, how deep it goes, various other aspects of it and I think

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Barry Gray
11:05 P.M.

Gray's guests were Congressman John Lindsay (R-NY); Clayton Willis, formerly of Newsweek; Conrad Kellin (?), of Hudson Institute, formerly of Radio Free Europe; Stanley Swinton, of Associated Press; Pierre Huess, Hearst UN correspondent, President of the United Nations Correspondents Association.

GRAY: "You read Mr. Tully's new book, the CIA?"

LINDSAY: "No I have not, but you lead me right to a -- what would be one of the next moves on Capitol Hill and I will be part of it too, which will be to establish for the first time a joint committee over the subject of the CIA.

"I was very much opposed to this notion for quite a while..."

GRAY: "What does that mean?"

LINDSAY: "...and I've done a complete reversal in my thinking on it. I think it's high time that somebody -- and there isn't anybody unless it's hopefully a responsible group in the Congress that would take a hard look."

"Mr. Congressman, can you admit the possibility..."

GRAY: "Mr. Huess."

HUESS: "That maybe the CIA functioned for a change and made it possible Echavarria to get bootied out and..."

LINDSAY: "Oh yes. I'm not -- I'm not excluding that possibility."

HUESS: "Because if you know the Dominican situation, after all there were two military factions which clashed. In other words Barry you have the military faction kicking out the Trujillo faction in the military, and don't forget it was Ramfis who was behind this probably with Echavarria, they were were schoolmates, they were pals and it's a pretty strange event this indictment that is now hanging over his head for murder and I have a feeling that Echavarria was more or less a puppet of Ramfis and consequently the family (?) group which engineered the coup against Echavarria may have been pushed by someone other than public pressure, let's say. There isn't such a thing in the Dominican Republic as yet."

GRAY: "That's possible. I agree with that."

HUESS: "And I feel that perhaps we ought to -- if it's true that the new CIA under the new man maybe has functioned to the point where what's his name Rusk didn't have to take his pajamas off and get into his pants."

LINDSAY: "Well I've got more confidence in Rusk than I do the new man if you want to know my opinion."

Anxious to Bark About Diplomats

BY HENRY J. TAYLOR

Where was Sen. J. William Fulbright when President Kennedy sent poor Edmund A. Gullion as ambassador to the Congo? Sometimes Fulbright has serious lapses, like Nehru. This was another of them.

As a member, and later chairman, of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the eloquent Arkansan made much hay and many headlines by crusading for excellence in a President's choice of envoys abroad. Why is he silent now?

Sen. Fulbright, interestingly enough, owed his over-all power to President Eisenhower.

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The Republican President could do little in foreign affairs involving the Senate without the OK of this key Democrat. Fulbright had to be heavily consulted and, in fact, pampered. He could, and did, hurl thunderbolts at the President's policies, appointments, etc.

It stamped him as a warrior and scared the State Department. "Be right with Fulbright" was the tip for departmental promotions and other gains.

Fulbright hurtled himself upward. Accordingly, Mr. Kennedy's election was a personal catastrophe for him. His party won. A Democrat entered the White House who, in the ironic way politics does the twist, need only nod "good morning" to this chairman if he chose, and let it go at that. No nonsense permitted. Atropos was ready with her shears.

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The result was prompt, although Fulbright still gurgles occasionally like the last breath of Vulcan.

In his highly publicized crusades demanding fine ambassadors abroad, his melody was foolproof. It allowed him to be both right and righteous at the same time. This is manna from heaven for most orators and all politicians, and Fulbright is both.

For example, when President Eisenhower nominated one of the nation's most respected men of large affairs and proven judgment — Amory Houghton—to be ambassador to France, Fulbright could only see that Hough-

ton did not speak French.

He humbled the appointment, his finger wagging in dire warning that America must do better than this. (America has never done better than this in many a year, and Houghton was a splendid success in France.)

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However, when President Kennedy lost all touch with reality and nominated Gen. James Gavin as Houghton's successor, and thus dispatched a general — and a man of only military experience — to a country where De Gaulle is notorious for an almost pathologic contempt for generals, Fulbrights sat like Von Moltke, who has been described as silent in seven languages.

And this has been the Fulbright performance ever since his personal self-interest has been involved and it became more profitable politics for him to take a deep sleep on this important subject.

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Yet, the Senate's responsibility to confirm or reject each ambassadorial nomination remains. Chairman Fulbright's responsibility,

to which he so often attributed his super-interest, in envoys remains. There is a moral question of personal integrity involved here, exactly as there was when Nehru went into Goa.

It is appalling that the President and Secretary of State Rusk appointed poor Gullion to the Congo to supply on-the-spot judgment and action in this immense political, military and economic crisis of such profound importance.

Gullion is completely without experience in large affairs of any kind whatever — a long-time time-server in the lowly innards of the State Department.

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Where were the flashes of Fulbright fire? There were none. The warrior went out for lunch. And he is still out.

Will this chairman, awaking to his self-advantaged duties, ask for Gullion's transfer elsewhere? Either Fulbright meant what he said so forcefully for so many years or he is merely Nehru and Goa after all — the tragic gulf between an eloquent man's words and the deeds.